If Parliament enacts a law, and state governments refuse to implement it, what is the impact on the functioning of the Constitution and the federal structure of our polity? This is a question that has emerged in recent times with increasing urgency and frequency. The blame does not lie with the Constitution. Its language is crystal clear, delineating a Union of States, where the powers of the central government and those of the states are clearly defined.
The recent passage of the Waqf Bill by Parliament has reignited this contentious debate: Can state governments refuse to implement a central law if they believe it infringes upon their autonomy or contradicts their policy priorities? The question strikes at the heart of India’s federal structure, testing the delicate balance between parliamentary sovereignty and state rights.
The Waqf Bill, aimed at streamlining the administration of waqf properties and enhancing oversight, has been met with resistance from some states, particularly those governed by opposition parties. Their defiance raises fundamental constitutional and political questions—does India’s federalism permit states to reject central laws, and what are the consequences of such resistance for governance and national unity?
India’s Constitution establishes a quasi-federal system where Parliament has supremacy in certain domains, but states retain legislative and executive authority in others. The Waqf Bill, like many central laws, falls under the Concurrent List (List III of the Seventh Schedule), meaning both Parliament and state legislatures can legislate on the subject. However, Article 254 of the Constitution is clear: if there is a conflict between a central law and a state law on a Concurrent subject, the central law prevails.
Such clashes have occurred in the past too. The Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), passed in 2019, faced vehement opposition from several states, including Kerala, West Bengal, Punjab, and Rajasthan. Kerala’s government went a step further by filing a suit in the Supreme Court, arguing that the law was unconstitutional. While states cannot legally block the CAA, some refused to cooperate with its implementation, such as denying the use of state machinery for the National Population Register (NPR) exercise, which was seen as a precursor to the National Register of Citizens (NRC).
The three farm laws passed in 2020 were met with fierce resistance, particularly from Punjab, Rajasthan, and Chhattisgarh. Punjab’s state assembly even passed counter-resolutions rejecting the laws. Though the Supreme Court stayed their implementation, the episode demonstrated how states could mobilise political and public pressure against central legislation.
This column is not about the merits of these laws. I myself have reservations about the CAA hyphenated with the National Register of Citizens (NRC), certain provisions of the Land Laws, and those of the Waqf Bill. The purpose here is to discuss the constitutional position if states refuse to accept, or are non-cooperative in the implementation of a law duly passed by Parliament. The Constitution does not explicitly provide states with the power to outrightly reject a central law. Instead, it offers mechanisms for cooperative federalism: Article 256 mandates that states comply with laws made by Parliament. Article 365 allows the President to impose President’s Rule if a state fails to adhere to central directives. Article 131 permits states to challenge central laws in the Supreme Court if they believe their rights are infringed. Despite these provisions, states have often resisted implementing central laws, citing political disagreement, federal overreach, or ideological opposition.
The key issue then becomes that of “cooperative federalism”, which the current government avers is its policy, and which the Constitution endorses in practice. Is cooperative federalism functioning as it should today? Are states consulted appropriately before laws are passed by the central government to which state governments are opposed or have reservations about? In a democracy, the principles of federalism can survive only if there are democratic consultations. India’s federal structure must balance state autonomy with national unity. While states have legitimate concerns, outright refusal to implement central laws is not the solution. Instead, the following approaches could strengthen federalism without undermining constitutional order:
One such is the greater use of the Inter-State Council. Established under Article 263, this body can mediate disputes before they escalate. However, this institution has become more or less extinct. A second tool is Pre-Legislative Consultations. The Centre should engage states more rigorously before passing laws affecting their jurisdiction, but this is hardly being seriously or sincerely pursued. A third is judicial clarity. The Supreme Court must provide clearer guidelines on when states can challenge central laws, and it is hoped that in future these will be available. Finally, there is a need for strengthening fiscal federalism. More financial autonomy for states could reduce tensions over central dominance.
It is true that state resistance is often driven by political rivalry rather than constitutional principles. When a state government and the Centre are ruled by opposing parties, defiance becomes a tool for mobilisation. This trend weakens governance and turns federalism into a battleground for partisan politics, where the key factor missing is trust.
The current deadlock over laws passed by Parliament, between an aggressive central government and recalcitrant opposition-ruled states, should be a wake-up call for all concerned. India cannot afford a state of erosion of Parliament’s authority, federal anarchy, or legislative chaos. Nor can it tolerate the one-sided imposition of New Delhi on the states.
(Courtesy:News 18)
